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The Prisoners' Dilemma Posed by Free Trade
Agreements: Can Open Access Provisions Provide an
Escape?
Meredith Kolsky Lewis*

Abstract
This article explains why free trade agreements (FTAs) that are not compliant with the
spirit of GATT Article XXIV's requirement that such agreements cover "substantialy all
the trade" between the parties pose serious challenges for the multilateral trading system. It
notes the paradoxical behavior of WTO members in continuing to negotiate such free trade
agreements to the detriment of the WTO. It characteriZes thisparadox as a form of Prisoners'
Dilemma, in that although members would be better offpursuing trade liberaliZation via the
WTO, their dominant strategy is to pursue FTAs. The articlegoes on to propose a pragmatic
solution to resolve the dilemma that attempts to navigate the difficulties posed by both
retrospective andprospective solutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines in detail why the proliferation of free trade
agreements (FTAs) presents a serious problem for the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the international trading system. I explain why WTO
members paradoxically persist in negotiating FTAs even though such
agreements undermine the WTO and offer a pragmatic solution to this
seemingly intractable dilemma
This article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the nature of the free
trade agreement problem. In particular, Part II addresses how FTAs threaten the
multilateral trading system established by the WTO and explains why Article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-the provision
that addresses FTA formation-suffers from interpretive difficulties and is
presently an ineffective tool. Part III identifies a paradox in WTO member
behavior: members believe negotiating trade concessions within the WTO
framework is preferable to entering into FTAs, yet members undermine the
strength of the WTO by continuing to negotiate FTAs apace. I characterize this
paradox as a form of Prisoners' Dilemma and utilize game theory concepts in
Part III to explain why the paradox occurs. Part IV addresses whether actions to
remedy the FTA problem are necessary. I argue that there is the potential for an
FTA to be declared inconsistent with Article XXIV in WTO dispute settlement
and that the ramifications such a decision would have are sufficiently serious
that it would be prudent for WTO members to address the problem proactively
rather than wait for a WTO dispute to arise. Part V identifies why addressing the
problem is so difficult, and defines the parameters within which any solution will
likely need to fall. Part VI suggests a pragmatic approach to the Article XXIV
problem that would fall within the narrow parameters set forth in Part V. It
proposes: (a) clarifying the meaning of "substantially all the trade" in Article
XXIV, (b) holding new FTAs to the agreed-to definition, and (c) permitting
parties to existing FTAs to either amend their agreements to conform to the
new definition or alternatively to amend their agreements to include an open
accession provision, if one is not already in place. This Part then acknowledges
and addresses some of the difficulties with the proposed approach, and also
identifies systemic benefits of the open accession option. Part VII concludes.
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II. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT PROBLEM
In order to illustrate the problem free trade agreements (FTAs)' pose for
the multilateral trading system, this Part first introduces the WTO, its precursor
entity (the GATT), and the core principle of most-favored nation (MFN). It
next explains how FTAs have eroded the MFN principle and how this
phenomenon has been able to occur under the current WTO rules. Finally, it
discusses the impact of proliferating FTAs on the WTO.
A. THE GATT, THE WTO, AND THE MFN PRINCIPLE
At the multilateral level, the WTO is the primary instrument through
which international trade is regulated. The WTO came into effect in 1995 and
covers, inter alia, trade in goods, services, and aspects of intellectual property.
Although the WTO itself is a relatively new organization, it grew out of an
earlier international effort to reduce trade barriers-the GATT.2 Beginning in
1948, GATT signatories negotiated successive rounds of tariff reductions. In its
Uruguay Round (1986-1994), the signatories agreed to form the WTO with the
GATT provisions remaining an integral part of the new organization.3
The GATT focused on lowering tariffs on goods as its primary form of
trade liberalization. While average tariff rates have dropped significantly over the
past sixty years, high tariffs remain in many developing countries. Moreover,
developed countries have maintained significant tariffs on sensitive sectors,
including agriculture and textiles. Thus, tariffs remain an issue of interest for
many WTO members.'

1

2

These agreements are variously referred to in the literature as Regional Trade Agreements
("RTAs"), Preferential Trade Agreements ("PTAs"), and Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs').
Although "RTAs" is perhaps the most commonly used term, it is not particularly accurate given
the increasing number of agreements between countries from different regions (for example, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between New Zealand, Chile, Brunei and Singapore).
"PTAs" is sometimes used with a hint of disapproval that, although sometimes warranted, is not
appropriate in all cases. This article uses "FTAs" to describe these agreements. Note that FTAs
are sometimes referred to as "free trade agreements" and sometimes, mirroring the language of
GATT Article XXIV, as "free-trade areas". These terms are synonymous and thus "FTA" is used
to refer to either or both terms.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat A-11, TIAS 1700, 55 UNTS 194 (1947)
(hereinafter "GATT").

3

For general background regarding the WTO and the GATT, see Peter Van den Bossche, The Law
and Pol&g of the World Trade OrganiZation, chs 1, 2, 4 (Cambridge 2005); Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas
J. Schoenbaum, and Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization:Law, Practice, and Poliy, chs
1, 3 (Oxford 2d ed 2006); Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio, World Trade Law: Text, Materialsand
Commentary, ch 3 (2008); World Trade Organization, What is the World Trade Organi.ation?,online at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif.e/factl_e.htm (visited Sept 23, 2010).

4

The WTO Agreements cover trade in goods, services, and intellectual property, and address both
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.
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One of the core principles of the GATT and WTO is that of MFN. The
MFN principle requires WTO members to provide:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation... any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.5
In other words, with respect to tariffs and other charges, members cannot give
better rates to some members than to others. Thus, if a WTO member sets a
tariff on coffee imports of 10 percent, it must provide all WTO members with
that same 10 percent rate, unless there is an applicable exception, which would
permit the member to charge a lesser rate. The MFN principle is one of equality:
members should not discriminate amongst their WTO-member trading partners.
By liberalizing in tandem and applying all tariff reductions to all members, trade
barriers should be reduced comprehensively and without favoritism.'
B. EROSION OF THE MFN PRINCIPLE
In practice, the MFN principle has a number of exceptions. The most
important, for the purposes of this article, is found in GATT Article XXIV,
which permits members to enter into customs unions (CUs) or free-trade areas.
These types of agreements are inconsistent with the MFN principle because they
entail agreement partners giving each other benefits (usually in the form of tariff
reductions, ultimately to zero) that are not also extended to other WTO
members. Thus, in the absence of an applicable exception permitting such
arrangements, FTAs and CUs would violate GATT Article I.
In practice, WTO members have entered into so many FTAs, customs
unions, and other permissible discriminatory arrangements that, as has been
s
6

7

GATT, Art I (cited in note 2).
For discussions of the MFN principle, see Van den Bossche, Law and Poliy of the World Trade
OrganiZaionat 308-18 (cited in note 3); Lester and Mercurio, World Trade Law at 322-39 (cited in
note 3); Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, The World Trade OrganiZadionat 201-33 (cited in
note 3).
In a free-trade area, or FTA, members reduce the tariffs between the members to zero, but
maintain separate external tariff systems. Thus in an FTA between A and B, A's tariff rate on all
products from B should go to zero. However, A may set an external tariff rate on coffee from C,
D, and all other WTO members at any rate it chooses, 15 percent for example, and B may set its
external tariff rate on coffee at a rate different from that chosen by A, 10 percent for example. In
a customs union, the members agree both to remove all internal tariffs amongst the members and
also to establish a common external tariff system. The most prominent customs union is the
European Union.
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ruefully lamented, MFN has eroded to the point where having MFN treatment is
akin to "LFN" or "least-favored nation."' A stark example of this phenomenon
is the EU, which only provides MFN treatment to nine WTO members.9 The
rest of the 153 WTO members are either in FTAs with the EU or are otherwise
entitled to tariff treatment that is more preferential than the MFN rates.'o
One might ask why it has been possible for members to enter into so many
FTAs to the point of eroding the core principle of MFN. While FTAs are likely
to promote trade within the FTA, they will likely divert trade away from more
efficient producers not party to the FTA." It is unlikely, therefore, that the
drafters of the GATT intended for FTAs to be as prevalent as they have
become. 2 The provisions governing FTAs and customs unions are generally

8

See, for example, Peter Sutherland, The Doha Development Agenda: Poltical Challenges to the World
Trading System: A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 8 J Intl Econ L 363, 366 (2005) ("[The reality is that one
of the central pillars of the WTO-most-favoured nation ("MFN") treatment-has been
undermined to the point that it may become meaningless."); Report by the Consultative Board to
the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WVTO: Addressing Institutional
Challenges in the New Millennium 19 (WTO 2004) ("Consultative Board Report").

9

The only WTO members to whom the EU does not provide preferential market access above and
beyond its MFN commitments are Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, China, Japan,
Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and the US. See Consultative Board Report at 23 (cited in note
8).
Another way preferential treatment may be provided is pursuant to the GATT Enabling Clause.
The Enabling Clause, more formally known as the "Decision on Differential and More
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries," was
adopted by the GATT contracting parties in 1979. It permits developed countries to give
differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries than they give to other
developed countries, on a non-reciprocal basis, and is exercised primarily through national
Generalized System of Preferences programs. In addition, the Enabling Clause permits
developing countries to enter into regional arrangements amongst themselves that do not rise to
the level of comprehensiveness of an FTA, and provides the legal basis for the Global System of
Trade Preferences pursuant to which developing countries may grant each other trade
concessions without extending such concessions on an MFN basis to all WTO members. See
generally WTO Trade and Development Committee, Work on Special and Differential Provisions,
at
online
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/deveLe/devspecial-differentiaLprovisions-e.htm
(visited Sept 23, 2010).

10

11

For example, assume three countries, A, B and C. B and C both produce widgets. C's producers
are more efficient than B's and sell widgets for 10 dollars. B's producers sell widgets for 12
dollars. A maintains a 30 percent tariff on imported widgets. Thus C's widgets are sold in A for 13
dollars, and B's for $15.60. A's customers will likely buy widgets from C's producers. However, if
A and B enter into a free trade agreement, A's tariff on widgets from B will go to zero. Now B's
widgets are sold in A for 12 dollars, while C's widgets are sold for 13 dollars. Trade will therefore
be diverted from the more efficient producers in C to the less efficient producers in B.

12

For historical background regarding Article XXIV and the motivations that led to its drafting, see
generally James H. Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATTI /TO: Arnicle XXIV and the
Internal Trade Requirement (Asser 2002); Kerry Chase, Multilateralism Compromised: The Mysterious
Origins of GATTArticle XXIV, 5 World Trade Rev 1 (2006); Sydney M. Cone, III, The Promotion of
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viewed as exceptions to the MFN principle.13 In other words, if the criteria set
forth in the relevant article, GATT Article XXIV, are not satisfied, the default
rule of MFN should apply. 4
On its face, Article XXIV imposes fairly rigorous conditions for entry into
either a CU or FTA. The most important of these are found in GATT Article
XXIV:5, which provides that "the provisions of this Agreement shall not
prevent...the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area" provided
that the new CU or FTA does not raise its external tariffs above pre-agreement
levels," and in Article XXIV:8, which defines "customs union" and "free-trade
area" to be groupings in which tariffs and other restrictive regulations on
commerce "are eliminated on substantially all the trade" between the parties to
the CU or FTA" within a ten-year timeframe. The rules thus envision allowing
deviations from MFN for agreements that are comprehensive in scope and that
bring tariffs down to zero on goods traded between the parties. Notwithstanding
these rules, the reality is that the majority of FTAs do not meet the criteria set
forth in Article XXIV.
While Article XXIV establishes the conditions under which FTAs and CUs
may be formed, there is no satisfactory mechanism for monitoring FTAs and
CUs to ensure they satisfy the definition. In the GATT era, there were individual
working parties to consider each FTA or CU. In 1996, a Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements (CRTA) was established, in part, to centralize the review
process in a single committee. The CRTA is tasked with reviewing notified
agreements for compliance with Article XXIV.17 However, the WTO, like the
GATT before it, makes decisions by consensus, and all members that wish to
participate on the CRTA are entitled to do so." The CRTA, again, like the
GATT working groups that preceded it, was unable to reach consensus on the
status of the agreements submitted to it." The process has been recognized as

13

Free-TradeAreas Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored-Naion Treatment and Impeial Preference",26 Mich J
Intl L 563 (2005).
For a discussion of whether FTAs are on equal footing with MFN under the GATT or are
instead an exception to the MFN rule, see Thomas Cottier and Marina Foltea, Constitutional
Functions of the WITO and Regional Trade Agreements, in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino, eds,
RegionalTradeAgreements and the WITO Legal ystem 43, 51-58 (Oxford 2006).

14

Id at 58.

15

GATT, Art XXIV:5(b) (cited in note 2).

16

Id at Art X!XIV:8(a),(b).

17

A further difficulty arises because WTO members have not always notified all of their FTAs to
the CRTA.
World Trade Organization, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Deiion of 6 Februay 1996,
WTO Doc WT/L/127 (Feb 7, 1996).
In the entire 47-year history of the GATT, only one working party concluded that an agreement
satisfied Article XXIV. This was the 1993 customs union between the Czech and Slovak
Republics-countries that had been joined together for the preceding seventy-five years as a

18

19
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dysfunctional and ineffective. Many WTO members have called over the years
for increased transparency with respect to FTAs. At the same time, however,
WTO members party to FTAs have recognized that a report judging their
agreement to be inconsistent with GATT Article XXIV could have negative
repercussions in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.20 To balance these
competing concerns, WTO members agreed in 2006 to implement new
transparency mechanisms with respect to FTAs and CUs. They determined that
the CRTA should issue reports, but that such reports could not be used in WTO
dispute settlement. 21
Under the new mechanism, FTAs are to be notified to the CRTA earlier in
the process. Data regarding the FTA must also be provided; that data will then
provide the basis for the Secretariat to make factual presentations to the
members for their consideration.2 2 It remains unclear what impact these reports
will have in the case of an FTA that appears not to satisfy Article XXIV. The
new transparency mechanism expressly provides that the Secretariat's factual
presentations "shall not be used as a basis for dispute settlement procedures or
to create new rights and obligations for Members."23 In other words, while a
report might describe the coverage of an FTA as less than comprehensive,
members cannot use that report as evidence that the agreement runs afoul of
Article XXIV. The new transparency mechanism is an improvement, but it does
not resolve the problem of what to do about nonconforming agreements.
One of the problems with monitoring FTAs and CUs is that the
"substantially all the trade" provision has not been defined with any precision. It
is unclear whether "substantially all" requires a quantitative or a qualitative
approach, or a combination of the two. Some argue that a given sector (such as
agriculture) can be excluded so long as the amount of trade covered as a whole is

20

21

single state. No conclusions were reached as to whether any other agreements were compatible or
incompatible with Article XXIV. See Chase, 5 World Trade Rev at 2 (cited in note 12).
World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Compendium of Issues Related to Regional
Trade Agreements: BackgroundNote by the Secretariat (Revision) 7, WTO Doc TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1 (Aug
1, 2002) ("Compendium of Issues").
See World Trade Organization, General Council Decision, TransparenyMechanismfor Regional Trade
Agreements, WTO Doc WT/L/671 (Dec 18, 2006) ("General Council Decision"). The General
Council Decision calls for the Secretariat to prepare factual presentations on FrAs that have been
notified to the WTO and for the CRTA to implement this mechanism. Although the General
Council Decision states that these factual presentations cannot be used for dispute settlement, it
also provides that this mechanism will be replaced with a permanent mechanism to be adopted as
a part of the Doha Round. In this context, members will review the legal relationship between
this mechanism and relevant WTO provisions relating to RTAs. Of course, the Doha Round is
still far from being concluded.

22

World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Report by the Chairman to the Trade
NegotiationsCommittee, WTO Doc TN/RL/18 (Jul 13, 2006).

23

General Council Decision at 3 (cited in note 21).

IT/inter 2011

637

ChicagoJournalof InternaionalLaw

substantial.24 Others believe that sectors cannot be excluded, no matter how
minimal the trade in that particular sector.2 5 The issue has only arisen once in
WTO dispute settlement, in the Turkey-Texiles dispute, and the Appellate Body
did not take the occasion to clarify the term other than to express that
"substantially all" means more than some, but less than all.26
In practice, the vast majority of FTAs among WTO members exclude
some portion of trade-often entire sectors-from their coverage. As a result,
the balance envisioned by the framers of the GATT-whereby FTAs and their
trade diverting effects would be tolerated so long as the agreements fully
liberalize trade among the parties-has not been realized.2 7 Even though the
WTO has the CRTA to review FTAs,28 there is still no institutional method or
practice of regulating whether FTAs comply with the conditions set out in
GATT Article XXIV, and no consequences for FTAs that do not comply.
Without any meaningful regulation of FTAs to ensure compliance with the
"substantially all the trade" criteria, Article XXIV has been called a "dead

article." 29
C. Effect of FTAs on the Multilateral Trading System
FTAs have proliferated at a remarkable pace since the inception of the
WTO. 3 0 As of February 2010, 462 agreements had been notified to the WTO.
These comprise 345 notifications under GATT Article XXIV, of which
24
25
26

27

28
29
3o

This is particularly true of parties to European FTAs, which often exclude agriculture in whole or
in part. See Cottier and Foltea, ConsitutionalFunctionsofthe WTO at 48 (cited in note 13).
See, for example, Zakir Hafez, Weak Displine: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging IFTO
jurisprudenceon RTAs, 79 ND L Rev 879, 892 (2003).
See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of
48 (Nov 19, 1999) ("Neither the
Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc WT/DS34/AB/R
GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES nor the WTO Members have ever reached an agreement on
the interpretation of the term 'substantially' in this provision. It is clear, though, that 'substantially
all the trade' is not the same as all the trade, and also that 'substantially all the trade' is something
considerably more than merely some of the trade."). Some argue the "substantially all the trade"
requirement should be based on a percentage of the value of trade between the FTA partners;
others think it should be based on a percentage of the tariff lines covered by the agreement. For a
summary of some of the competing viewpoints, see Compendium of Issues at 18 (cited in note
20).
See Cone, The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas at 567 (cited in note 12) (examining the history of
Article XXIV and describing it as representing an effort to encourage a European customs union
while requiring MFN treatment).
See World Trade Organization, Work of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, online at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/region.e/regcom-e.htm (visited Sept 23, 2010).
See, for example, Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the RecprocalTrade Agreements Act, and the IWTO, 1
NYU J L & Bus 709 (2005).
FTAs are far more prevalent than customs unions or other types of preferential arrangements,
and are thus the primary focus of this article.
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approximately 90 percent are FTAs and 10 percent are CUs.3 1 While some have
argued that FTAs are stepping stones on the path to multilateral trade
liberalization,32 many are concerned that FTAs, particularly ones inconsistent
with Article XXIV, instead represent stumbling blocks.33
The first problem with having so many FTAs is the erosion of the MFN
principle, discussed above.34 The entire structure of the WTO rules is premised
on nondiscrimination; this structure is compromised when members engage
overwhelmingly in FTAs that institutionalize discrimination.
Second, the large amount of resources (both human and financial) WTO
members invest in negotiating FTAs necessarily diminishes the resources
available to participate effectively and in a committed fashion in WTO
negotiations.35 The current round of negotiations, the Doha Round, is entering
its ninth year with no end in sight. While the issues under negotiation are
challenging, it is clear that members are not devoting their full efforts to the
pursuing
FTAs.
are,
instead,
concurrently
Doha
Round
and
Third, because members are picking and choosing which areas to liberalize
in their nonconforming FTAs, they are making the WTO negotiating process
31

32

The remainder comprises thirty-one agreements made pursuant to the Enabling Clause and
eighty-six agreements covering trade in services (and therefore covered by Article V of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, rather than by the GATT, which covers trade in goods).
See World Trade Organization Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, online at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/regionse.htm (visited Sept 23, 2010).
Then-US Undersecretary of Treasury Lawrence Summers once famously said: "[e]conomists
should maintain a strong, but rebuttable, presumption in favour of all lateral reductions in trade
barriers, whether they be multi-, uni-, bi-, tri-, plurilateral." Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Polig:
The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne 0. Krueger, eds, The Dangerous
Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (AEI 1995), quoting Lawrence Summers, Regionalism and the
World Trading System, in Poliy Implications of Trade and Curreny Zones, Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas 8 (1991).

33

See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How PreferentialAgreements Undermine
Free Trade (Oxford 2008); Nuno Limio, Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for
MulilateralTrade LiberaliZadon:Evidence for the United States, 96 Amer Econ Rev 896 (2006) (finding
that FTAs have impeded multilateral trade liberalization); Cohn B. Picker, Regional Trade Agreements
v. the WITO: A Proposalfor Reform ofAricle XXIV to Counter this InstitutionalThreat,26 U Penn J Intl
Econ L 267 (2005); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Prisoners' Dilemma and Free Trade Agreements: An
Appication of Game Theog to Trade LiberakZation Strategy, in Laurence Boulle et al, eds, Challenges to
Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bilateral,Preferential and Regional Agreements (Kluwer 2008) ("Game
Theory"); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Free Trade Agreement Paradox,21 New Zealand Universities L
Rev 554 (2005); Thomas Cottier, The Erosion of Non-Discrimination: Stern Warning without True
Remedies, 8 J Intl Econ L 595 (2005) (noting the problem of noncompliant FTAs as stumbling
blocks); Consultative Board Report (cited in note 8).

34

See Part II.B.

35

See Consultative Board Report at 23 (cited in note 8) ("[The diversion of skilled and experienced
negotiating resources into [FTAs] - especially for developing nations and probably for rich
countries also - is too great to permit adequate focus on the multilateral stage."); Picker, 26 U
Penn J Intl Econ L at 271 (cited in note 33).
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more difficult. The WTO operates its Doha Round of negotiations on a "single
undertaking" basis, meaning that nothing is agreed upon until everything is
agreed upon. Thus, members have an incentive to make progress on all issues of
importance in order to achieve an overall deal. In the absence of significant
numbers of FTAs-as was the case during the Uruguay Round negotiations that
led to the formation of the WTO-egotiating countries cannot obtain the
benefits they want without also being willing to make some sacrifices in more
sensitive trading sectors. The ability to negotiate Article XXIV-inconsistent
FTAs upsets this balance. Now, members can agree, via their FTAs, to liberalize
only those areas they choose to, and omit the most difficult and contentious
sectors (such as agriculture). The result is that there are fewer sweeteners to
provide in the WTO context to induce members to liberalize the more sensitive
sectors. I have noted elsewhere that this is akin to giving a child dessert, and
then trying to get him to eat his vegetables; with treats of market access already
in hand, it becomes more challenging to get WTO members back to the table
for the less palatable negotiating points that remain.36
In addition, the overlapping commitments and inconsistent rules
between the various FTAs-commonly referred to as a "spaghetti bowl" 3 7 further diminish the potential for FTAs to serve as stepping stones to
multilateralism. One of the most significant problems in this regard is the lack of
consistency in the rules of origin (ROOs) applied in different FTAs. In order for
an FTA member to attain the duty-free access to the partner's market to which it
is entitled, its exporters will need to demonstrate that the products they ship are
indeed from the FTA member, rather than from a country outside the
agreement. While this presents little difficulty for the exporter of a commodity,
the inquiry becomes more difficult for products with multiple manufacturing
processes or comprising both imported and domestic parts. From which country
is a scarf made with silk from country A, loomed in country B, cut and dyed in
country C, and embossed and tasseled in country D? ROOs help answer this
question. Unfortunately, WTO members apply several different formulations to
determine product origin. This leads to overlapping and, in some cases,
inconsistent rules and obligations. Such inconsistency makes it less feasible to
combine existing FTAs into bigger and bigger free-trade areas.38

36

Lewis, 21 New Zealand Universities L Rev at 562 (cited in note 33).

37

See Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Poliy at 2-3 (cited in note 32).
It also makes administering FTAs costly, sometimes to the point of rendering them uneconomic
to take advantage of. See David Palmeter, Some Inherent Problems with Free Trade Agreements 27 L &
Poly in Intl Bus 991, 996 (1995-96) (noting that the cost of demonstrating country of origin led
exporters of up to 25 percent of the trade from individual European Free Trade Association
countries that would presumably have been eligible for preferential access to the European Union
to forego that preferential rate and just pay the standard MFN rate of duty).

38
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A final problem FTAs pose for the WTO relates to power imbalances. In
the WTO context, members conclude negotiations and make decisions on a
consensus basis. Under this system, even a weak member could, in theory, hold
up the conclusion of a trade round. In addition, in the WTO, members often
join together to negotiate in blocs. For example, the G-90 is a grouping of 90odd developing countries that negotiate together on certain issues of common
interest. In the FTA context, however, there are usually just two countries
negotiating. It is often the case that one party is significantly more economically
and politically powerful than the other (for example, the US or the EU) and is
able largely to dictate the terms of the agreement to the weaker party.
Developing countries, in particular, may not achieve as favorable outcomes from
bilateral negotiations as from multilateral negotiations and may be losing their
ability to help choose the direction trade liberalization will take.39 Because the
most powerful countries are able to dictate terms in their FTAs that the WTO
membership would not accept as a whole-for example, TRIPS-plus intellectual
property provisions in the US's FTAs 4 0-it may become increasingly difficult to
reach common ground on these issues in the WTO context.
This troubling situation has led many to identify the spread of WTOinconsistent FTAs as undermining the MFN principle and threatening the
continuing vitality of the WTO as an institution.41 These concerns are not new;
indeed nearly forty years ago Ken Dam wrote about the flaws in Article XXIV
39

40

41

See Frederick M. Abbott, A New Dominant Trade Spedes Emerges: Is Bilateralism a Threat?, 10 J Intl
Econ L 571, 583 (2007) ("weaker actors have a better chance to have their voices heard, and their
policy choices taken into account" in the multilateral consensus-based system); Guy Harpaz, When
East Meets West: Approximation of Laws in the EU-MediterraneanContext, 43 Common Market L Rev
993, 999 (2006) (discussing the expectation by the EU that in connection with its European
Neighbourhood Policy, its Mediterranean neighbours will unilaterally "approximate" or align their
legislation to some degree to that of the EU rather than the parties engaging in a cooperative
process of give and take); Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT *33
(NBER Working Paper No 6049, June 1998) (concluding that free trade agreements prevent the
implementation of an efficient multilateral agreement based on the GATT pillars of nondiscrimination and reciprocity). See also C. O'Neal Taylor, The Changing Tide of Trade: The Social,
Polical and EnvironmentalImphcaions of Regional Trade Agreements, 28 SLU Pub L Rev 155 (2008);
Moshe Hirsch, The Sodology of Internadonal Economic Law: Sodological Analysis of the Regulation of
Regional Trade Agreements in the World Trading System, 19 Eur J Intl L 277 (2008).
The formation of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") Agreement was
highly controversial, with developing countries largely opposed. Since its entry into force, the
United States has insisted in its FTA negotiations on provisions that provide even more stringent
intellectual property protections than does the TRIPS Agreement. These provisions are termed
"TRIPS-plus." See, for example, Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in
Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino, eds, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System 215
(Oxford 2006).
See generally Dam, 1 NYU J L & Bus 709 (cited in note 29). For a more theoretical analysis of
whether FTAs are a complement or an alternative to multilateral trade liberalization, see Ngunu
N. Tiny, Regionalism and the WTO: Mutual Accommodation at the Global Trading System, 11 Intl TLR
126 (2005).
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and the problems that could arise out of the inability to ensure that FTAs would
satisfy the Article.42
FTAs thus create significant difficulties for the multilateral trading system.
It would be better for the WTO, as an institution, if members were not entering
into so many FTAs, particularly those in non-compliance with Article XXIV. In
addition, many constituencies believe FTAs to be a second-best strategy for
individual WTO members. Government officials and corporate officers
routinely state that their first preference is for there to be a successful Doha
Yet,
Round of negotiations in the WTO, and commentators agree.
paradoxically, WTO members nonetheless undermine the WTO by continuing
to pursue FTAs. Part III examines why this may be occurring.
III. THE FTA PROBLEM AS PRISONERS' DILEMMA
The above section has set forth why FTAs should be seen as a second-best
alternative to WTO liberalization from the standpoint of both what is best for
the WTO and what is best for its individual members. Despite this, however,
there are more and more FTAs being negotiated. This section explores why
WTO members engage in the seemingly paradoxical behavior of pursuing FTAs
despite their stated preference for WTO liberalization.
A. Why Do WTO Members Enter into FTAs?
There are numerous reasons why WTO members choose to enter into
FTAs, notwithstanding the general belief that WTO liberalization is more
fruitful and that it is important to continue progressing in the multilateral forum.
For purposes of this article, I will focus on but a few of these.
First, members enter into FTAs for political, strategic, and other
noneconomic reasons. Thus, the potential for obtaining better market access
through the WTO process will not preclude members from entering into certain
FTAs. Examples of FTAs that reflect noneconomic goals are the US-Jordan

42

See Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and Internaional Economic Organi:aion (University of
Chicago 1970).

43

See, for example, Jo-Ann Crawford and Sam Laird, Regional Trade Agreements and the IVTO *18
(CREDIT Research Paper No 00/3, 2000) ("There can be little doubt that the main economic
advantages to participants in regional trade agreements would be even greater if the liberalization
were carried out on a wider, multilateral scale. RTAs are a second-best solution.").
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FTA;" the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement between
Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei;45 and the US-Australia FTA.4 6
Second, FTAs lead to shifts in comparative advantage, and therefore spur
countries to seek to re-establish the previous balance. The New Zealand and
Australia FTAs with Thailand demonstrate this dynamic, sometimes referred to
as "domino regionalism," 47 or the "me too effect."4 8 Australia and New Zealand
export many similar agricultural products. Prior to Australia's entry into an FTA
with Thailand, Australia and New Zealand competed on even footing in the
Thai market. Once the Australia-Thailand FTA took effect, however, New
Zealand exporters still faced tariffs on their products while Australian exporters
did not. New Zealand was, therefore, placed at a relative disadvantage in the
Thai market, and quickly worked to negotiate its own FTA with Thailand.4
A third reason WTO members negotiate FTAs is to proceed with trade
liberalization more quickly, and perhaps more broadly, than is possible in the
WTO. The WTO process is extremely labor-intensive and time-consuming, as
consensus must be reached on all issues before an agreement is concluded.
Countries may therefore prefer to negotiate with one country at a time to
achieve at least some degree of liberalization in a shorter time period. In
addition, there are areas, such as competition law and investment, which the
WTO membership as a whole is not willing to place on the negotiating agenda,
but which individual countries may seek to liberalize with like-minded trading
partners.
In addition to the above reasons, one of the drivers leading WTO
members to negotiate FTAs is the ability to negotiate WTO-inconsistent
agreements without censure. It is much easier to negotiate an FTA that excludes
agriculture and textiles than to negotiate a comprehensive, WTO-consistent
agreement, or to conclude a round of WTO negotiations. As is fleshed out in the
following section, the lack of punishment for entering into "bad" FTAs

44

This agreement is largely seen as a reward for Jordan for having entered into a peace agreement
with Israel. See Picker, 26 U Penn J Intl Econ L at 278 n 40 (cited in note 33).

45

As is discussed below, this agreement (also called the "P-4 Agreement") is a strategic one, open
for accession to other countries, and is intended to serve as a model, high quality agreement for
potential expansion across APEC and/or other countries. New Zealand already had FTAs in
place with Chile and Singapore; it is clear that its motivation for forming this agreement was not
the access to tiny Brunei's market, but rather something more strategic.

46

This agreement is viewed as a reward to Australia for sending troops to Iraq in support of the
US's War on Terror.

47

See, for example, Richard E. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism (NBER Working Paper
W4465, 1993).

48

See Lewis, 21 New Zealand Universities L Rev at 564 (cited in note 33).

49

Id.
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ultimately leads members to make choices that are not necessarily in their own
best interests.
B. The Prisoners' Dilemma Model 5 o
It is paradoxical that WTO members are adopting strategies that seem
contrary to their acknowledged best interests. This paradox can be understood
as an example of a Prisoners' Dilemma. The term "Prisoners' Dilemma" derives
from a popular example often used to illustrate a specific type of decisionmaking conundrum. In the example, two individuals have committed a crime
and have been brought into custody for questioning. The criminals have
previously agreed with one another that, if apprehended, neither would confess.
The prisoners are kept in separate rooms, unable to consult with one another.
Each is given the same information: if one of them confesses to the crime but
the other does not, the confessor will be released while the other individual will
receive a lengthy jail term of, for example, fifteen years. If both individuals
confess, they will each receive a shorter jail sentence of, for example, three years.
And finally, if neither person confesses to the crime, they will each serve an even
shorter time in jail of, for example, one year."
Prisoner A Stays Silent

Prisoner A Confesses

Prisoner B Stays Silent

Both serve 1 year

Prisoner B Confesses

A serves 15 years; B

B serves 15 years; A
goes free
Both serve 3 years

goes

free

The prisoners have to decide independent of one another what to do.
Under a Prisoners' Dilemma, each person's rational decision will always be to
betray the other party, even though they would each fare better if both
cooperated. The outcome where each betrays the other is known as the Nash
equilibrium.
An examination of the payout structure illustrated above demonstrates why
this is the case. Prisoner A can "cooperate" with Prisoner B by keeping his
promise and remaining silent, or he can "defect" by confessing and breaking his
promise. In evaluating what to do, Prisoner A will realize the following: If
50

51

The remainder of Section III is, with minor edits (and with the publisher Kluwer's consent)
reproduced from Lewis, Game Theory at 26-33 (cited in note 33). See also Lewis, 21 New Zealand
Universities L Rev at 568-74 (cited in note 33).
There are infinite variations that could be used for these figures; so long as the outcomes fit this
general pattern of cooperating resulting in a better outcome than defecting, a Prisoners' Dilemma
will result.
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Prisoner B cooperates and does not confess, Prisoner A will be set free if he
defects by confessing, but will receive one year in jail if he also cooperates and
keeps silent. Thus if Prisoner B cooperates, Prisoner A would do better to defect
and confess than to cooperate and keep silent (payoff of no jail time versus one
year). If Prisoner B defects and confesses, Prisoner A will receive three years in
jail if he also defects and confesses, but fifteen years if he keeps his word and
remains silent. Thus, if Prisoner B defects, Prisoner A would still do better by
defecting than by cooperating (payoff of three years versus fifteen years). It is,
therefore, better for Prisoner A to always defect, regardless of what Prisoner B
does, and therefore Prisoner A will always betray Prisoner B and confess.
Prisoner B conducts the same analysis, and will also always betray Prisoner A.
The traditional model has Prisoners A and B rationally deciding to defect
by confessing, when each would do better to cooperate and remain silent.
Prisoners' dilemmas exist in many different types of contexts and can involve
multiple players and/or multiple iterations. There are some general
characteristics common to all Prisoners' Dilemmas, however. Each case of the
Prisoners' Dilemma will reflect three essential features:
First,each player has two strategies: to cooperate or to defect.
Second, each player's dominant strategy-the one that will give a party a
superior outcome regardless of what the other party does-will be to defect
(that is, confess to the crime in the traditional example).
Third, the dominance solution equilibrium, called the Nash equilibrium, is
worse for both players than the non-equilibrium situation in which each plays
the dominated strategy of cooperating.52
The Prisoners' Dilemma represents a set of circumstances under which the
equilibrium outcome has both parties to a dilemma consistently choosing a
strategy that results in a less favorable outcome than had they both chosen the
opposing strategy.
C. Applying the Model to WTO Members' Trade
Liberalization Decisions
In this section I will demonstrate that the behavior of WTO members in
pursuing their "second-best" option of FTAs fits the pattern of a Prisoners'
Dilemma: members' decisions are rational, but do not result in the most
favorable possible outcome.

52

Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath, Games ofStrategp 87 (WW Norton & Co 1 ed 1999).
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1. WTO member strategies.
With respect to trade liberalization strategy, WTO members can opt to
cooperate, meaning they will lower trade barriers through their "first best"
strategy, namely by participating in the WTO multilateral process. WTO
members have, by acceding to the organization, agreed to undertake trade
liberalization measures specific to each country, and also to be bound generally
by the agreements falling under the WTO umbrella. In addition, being a WTO
member entails engaging in future additional rounds of negotiations to further
lower tariffs, subsidies, and other barriers to trade.
Alternatively, they can defect, by focusing their energies on bilateral trade
agreements. In determining whether members are defecting, it bears
consideration whether or not the FTAs they are entering into are consistent with

GATT Article XXIV."
Entering into FTAs that do not cover "substantially all the trade" (however
defined),54 or otherwise meet the requirements of Article XXIV, should be seen
as "defecting." Even without any official determination, it is evident that a great
many FTAs would fail to meet the "substantially all" criterion almost regardless
of measure.ss
The harder question is how to characterize FTAs that are comprehensive
enough in their scope to meet the Article XXIV requirements. Some argue that
even "clean" FTAs are still trade diverting and thus unwelcome, while others
contend that FTAs such as these are additive and thus beneficial to the ongoing
process of liberalization through the WTO. As to the latter point, if WVO
members universally seek to enter comprehensive FTAs, as such FTAs
53

This article primarily focuses on trade in goods and GATT Article XXIV, though the analysis
would also apply to trade in services and General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS")
Article V. The Enabling Clause provides additional rules that permit developing countries to enter
into preferential agreements amongst themselves that are not as comprehensive as FTAs as
defined under GATT Article XXIV, as well as for developing countries to grant each other (as a
class) more favorable tariff treatment than that provided to the WTO's developed country
members.

5

See discussion in Section II.B.

ss

For example, many of the EU's FTAs include significant exclusions for agricultural products and
likely fall afoul of the "substantially all" requirements of Article XXIV. See, for example, US Dept
of Agriculture GAIN Report, EU-25 Trade Poicy Monitoring, Least Favored Nation: Impact of EU
online
at
21,
2005),
Agriculture
(Apr
on
US
Trade
Agreements
www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200504/146119474.pdf (visited Sept 23, 2010). Japan's FTAs with
Singapore and Mexico similarly exclude a wide range of agricultural products. See Jayant Menon,
Bilateral Trade Agreements and the World Trading System (Nov 2006), online at
(visited
http://www.adbi.org/discussion-paper/2006/11/28/2067.bilateral.trade.agreements.wts/
Oct 25, 2010). Many other FTAs exclude entire sectors or what would otherwise represent large
volumes of trade.
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proliferate, they could in theory ultimately crumble away the remaining patches
of high tariffs existing between members. In practice, though, the chipping away
at tariffs through the entry into more and more interlocking FTAs is occurring,
if at all, on a regional basis. Thus, the world may be heading toward having three
mega trading blocs-the Americas, Europe, and Asia-which will largely
eliminate barriers among themselves, but retain them as between each other.
This pattern, if it continues, will make it exceedingly difficult to remove the
remaining inter-bloc barriers.
Nevertheless, Article XXIV-compliant FTAs presumably would not
undermine the multilateral process as much as the ones with sector exclusions
because they have taken the bitter with the sweet instead of just leaving the most
contentious, sensitive areas unliberalized." Furthermore, the members that have
entered the most comprehensive FTAs-for example New Zealand and
Singapore-seem to have remained quite interested in liberalization via the
WTO even though this may diminish their edge in their FTA partners' markets.
Nonetheless, even for broad-based FTAs, there is still a resource diversion
problem, particularly for developing countries, and thus there is a cost to
progress in the WTO. The only exception to this, it seems, would be for FTAs
that are both comprehensive and made accessible for other members to join on
an open access basis."
This Prisoners' Dilemma analysis therefore includes the vast majority of
FTAs in the "defect" category, and broad, open access FTAs in the "cooperate"
category.

56

Given the inclusion of Article XXIV in the GATT, it is not surprising that the WTO has generally
focused its criticism most heavily on FTAs that appear to be inconsistent with Article XXIV.
Director-General Lamy has stated that although pursuing FTAs that meet the requirements of
Article XXIV would not make for a very good trade strategy, such comprehensive agreements
can, in moderation complement the WTO-serving as the "pepper in a good curry." WTO
Director General Pascal Lamy, Speech to the 2007 Confederation of Indian Industries
Partnership Summit 2007, Multilateralor BilateralTrade Agreements: Which Way to Go? (Jan 17, 2007)
online at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/sppLe/sppl53_e.htm (visited Oct 25, 2010).

57

Article XXIV-compliant FTAs can lead to a degree of trade diversion. See, for example, Jacob
Viner, The Customs Union Issue 44 (Carnegie 1950). This could be ameliorated in part by requiring
open-access FTAs such as the P-4 Agreement (also known as the "Trans-Pacific Economic
Partnership Agreement" and, more recently, in the context of a planned expansion of the
agreement, as the "Trans-Pacific Partnership") between New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and
Brunei. See, for example, Compendium of Issues at 27 (cited in note 20) ("the lack of flexible
accession provisions in many RTAs hampers their effectiveness in contributing to the growth of
world trade").
This is not intended to indicate that Article XXJV-compliant FTAs are necessarily negative from
an economic standpoint, but rather to suggest that their negotiation and entry has a cost for
multilateral liberalization. This cost is lower than the cost of sector-excluding FTAs, but there is a
cost, nonetheless.

5
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2. WTO members' dominant strategy
The dominant strategy for WTO members-the strategy members choose
because they perceive it to be their best option under the available
circumstances-appears to be defecting. If members with whom a given
member is competitive in export markets decide to eschew FTAs and only
liberalize through the multilateral process, the given member will do better to
defect-to enter into FTAs with other willing members-than to cooperate.
This option allows the defecting member to have its cake-lower tariffs from
other members-and eat it too, that is obtaining comparative advantage over its
competitors in select key markets (and often shielding sensitive sectors such as
agriculture from quick liberalization). As a result, members may perceive their
individual interests being maximized by going the bilateral route if other
members with whom they compete for export markets stick to the multilateral
path.
Likewise, if other WTO members with whom a member is competitive in
foreign markets go the FTA route, it is better for the given member to do that as
well; otherwise, its competitors will improve their comparative advantage in the
markets of their FTA partners and the given member will lose out." Mike
Moore, the former prime minister of New Zealand and former Director-General
of the WTO described the situation as follows:
Despite all I've written about the perils of unilateralism and bilateralism, I'd
be doing it if I were in government. There's a terrible cost to being left out.
The global economy is facing a "lose, lose" situation. However, we should
re-name the present spate of trade deals "preferential trade deals" because
they insult the concept of free trade. 60
The result, then, is precisely the phenomenon we have been seeing over the past
several years. WTO members have been flocking, all but universally, to enter
FTAs and, at the same time, their participation in multilateral negotiations has
not been dedicated enough to complete the Doha Round. This demonstrates
that, at present, the pursuit of FTAs is the dominant strategy and multilateral
behavior is the dominated strategy. This dynamic is illustrated in a simple
graphic below:

s9

See discussion of the New Zealand-Thailand FTA in Section III.A.

so

Mike Moore, Preferential, not Free Trade Deals, Gulf News (Apr 23, 2007),
http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/preferential-not-free-trade-deals-1.173593
Oct 25, 2010).
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Member B focuses
on WTO
Member B
focuses on

FTAs

Member A
focuses on FTAs
A wins more/B loses
more
win less/win less

Member A focuses on
WTO
win some/win some
A loses

more/B wins

more

1_1

3. The Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal
As illustrated above, the equilibrium resulting at present, whereby WTO
members are focusing on negotiating FTAs instead of on WTO liberalization, is
leading to a less favorable outcome for the participants than each would have
achieved by adopting its dominated strategy-to "cooperate" by focusing on
multilateral liberalization through the WTO negotiation process. The
equilibrium result is negative for the participants because they could identify
other results they would prefer to the one that actually results.61 The fact that the
rational decision in this situation is for members to take a bilateral approach, but
that this rational decision results in a suboptimal outcome,62 is what makes it fit
the pattern of a Prisoners' Dilemma.
The payoff structure shows results for two reasons: first, for the universal
reason that if one can cheat without getting caught, one will attain more benefit;
and second, because there is nothing to prevent the cheating by way of positive
or negative inducement.
a) 'Beggar thy Neighbor" Behavior. The phenomenon illustrated above occurs
regularly in international trade relations, and the Prisoners' Dilemma can be
applied in a variety of trade policy contexts. For example, trade policy generally
represents a Prisoners' Dilemma in that countries are generally seen as better off
under a system of free trade, yet the Nash equilibrium finds countries imposing
higher tariffs rather than lowering them:63
[t]he efficient trade policy that maximizes joint welfare is not a Nash
equilibrium, since each country does even better when it unilaterally

61

Dixit and Skeath, Games of Strategy at 87 (cited in note 52).

62

This result is not Pareto optimal because there are members that could be made better off (had
they all focused on the WTO) without making other members worse off.
Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, Mulilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Customs
Unions, 42 J Intl Econ 91, 98 n 6 (1997). See also Jeffrey Simser, GATS and FinandalSerwices:
Redefining Borders, 3 Buffalo U J Intl L 33, 40-41 (1996-97).

63
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exploits the terms-of-trade consequences of its policy choices and thereby
redistributes surplus from its trading partner to itself.64
This "beggar thy neighbor" behavior demonstrates that some form of
regulation is necessary to prevent countries from following their mercantilist
tendencies. 5 As such, the formation of the GATT, followed by the WTO, can
be seen as providing a solution to that particular Prisoners' Dilemma. With
respect to FTAs, regulatory mechanisms may also provide a solution.
b) The Failureto Police FTAs Effectivey. Another reason for the current payoff
structure is that there is no effective sanction at present to prevent members
from entering into FTAs, particularly ones that do not conform to the
requirements set forth in GATT Article XXIV. Resolving the dilemma can
perhaps be accomplished by changing the current payoff structure.
IV. IS IT NECESSARY To ADDRESS THE ARTICLE XXIV
PROBLEM?
While most commentators agree that the plethora of Article XXIVinconsistent FTAs undermines the WTO system to a degree, there are differing
views regarding what, if anything, should be done about the problem. While a
consultative body of experts deemed the FTA situation a serious problem for
the WTO, its solution-that the problem would go away once all tariffs are
lowered to zero-is not realistic in the short-term. In contrast, Fred Abbott
argues that while bilateralism will make it more difficult for the WTO to
conclude new agreements, "it seems doubtful that the WTO as an institution is

65

Bagwell and Staiger, 42 J Ind Econ at 98 n 6 (cited in note 63). While it is widely accepted that
opening markets leads to more trade and more wealth creation, countries also recognize that
being a holdout while others liberalize leads to even better individual results. Because this
recognition is widespread, many countries elect to holdout, resulting in an inefficient outcome.
Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, Regulatoy Co-opetition, 3 J Intl Econ L 235, 245 (2000). See

66

also Daniel A. Farber and Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatoy State: A GATT's-Eye View
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 Vand L Rev 1401, 1405 (1994) (arguing that in the trade context
"[a]n enforcement mechanism is required, not because it is in the interest of each state to defect
from the agreement-economists are pretty much united in the view that it isn't-but because the
mercantilist perspective that prevails in most political debate makes it seem so"); Andrew T.
Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Populafity of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 38 Virginia J Intl L 639, 641, 666-67 (1998) (likening least developed country behavior
with respect to BITs to a Prisoners' Dilemma).
Historically, the WTO has not taken any affirmative steps to dissuade members from entering

67

into noncompliant FTAs.
See generally Consultative Board Report (cited in note 8).
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at any great risk from the [F]TA phenomenon. It has simply been relegated to a
less central status."" I disagree with Abbott somewhat on this point. The WTO
as an institution faces a significant risk from the proliferation of FTAs. This risk
derives not so much from the presence of the agreements themselves-which,
as Abbott explains, may reduce the centrality of the WTO-but from the risk
that difficult issues will be aired in a WTO dispute with destabilizing effects.
While members may in large part be willing to disregard noncompliant FTAs
because their own agreements suffer the same flaws, it is possible that at some
point a member will put Article XXIV to the test substantively in WTO dispute
settlement.
To date, dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body have
assiduously avoided making substantive determinations as to the consistency of
any given FTA with the WTO." Some have argued that it should not be
possible for members to challenge the consistency of FTAs with Article XXIV;o
however, it seems clear that this is a justiciable issue, and it therefore could arise
at some point in WTO dispute settlement. Section 12 of the WTO
Understanding on Article XXIV GATT provides that "[t]he provisions of
Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994.. . may be invoked with respect to any
matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating
to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to the
formation of a customs union or a free-trade area."" The Appellate Body in the
Turkey-Textiles case also made clear that it would expect a panel to require the
country defending the FTA as falling within the Article XXIV exception to
prove the conditions of Article XXIV (paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) are met).72 A
dispute settlement panel, faced with the issue of whether the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was consistent with Article XXIV, found that
the US had made out a prima facie case that NAFTA was consistent with Article

68
69

70

71
72

Abbott, 10J Intl Econ L at 581 (cited in note 39).
In the GATT era, three panels faced claims arguing that a particular FTA was inconsistent with
the GATT. One of these panels was never activated; the other two (EC-TanifTreatment on
Imports of Citrus Productsfrom Certain Countriesin the MediterraneanRegion and EEC-ImportRegime of
Bananas) resulted in unadopted panel reports. For a discussion of these GATT Panels, see Petros
C. Mavroidis, IfI Don't Do It, Somebody Else Will (Or Won't): Testing the Compliance of PreferentialTrade
Agreements with the MultilateralRules, 40 J World Trade 187, 204-05 (2006); Sungjoon Cho, Breaking
the BarrierBetween Regionalsm and Mutilaterahsm:A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 Harv Intl
LJ 419, 437-38 (2001).
See, for example, Frieder Roessler, Are the judicial Organs of the World Trade Organitadon
Overburdened? in Porter, et al, eds, Effideng, Equity, and Legitimaq: The MultilateralTrading System at
the Millennium 308 (Brookings Institution 2001).
GATT, Art XXV(C) (cited in note 2).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textle
and Clothing Products%58-59, WTO Doc No WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct 22, 1999).
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XXIV. However, no counter-evidence was offered by the complainant, Korea,
and the panel did not engage in a detailed review of this issue.
A panel would very likely have the jurisdiction to determine whether a
given FTA was consistent with Article XXIV. However, in the first instance, one
might ask what WTO member could bring such a challenge? The answer is
"plenty of members." Standing likely would not present an obstacle, at least not
for many challenges. The Appellate Body has stated that any WTO member that
is a "potential exporter" has standing-framed as "sufficient legal interest"-to
initiate a panel proceeding.74 It is not necessary for the member initiating the
dispute to demonstrate a specific trade effect in order for a measure to be found
to be inconsistent with WTO obligations." Thus, it has been said that "the
burden of persuasion allocated to complainants is relatively low." 7 Indeed, there
have been a number of successful "as such" challenges to measures of WTO
members. In these cases, the laws have been challenged as being inconsistent
with WTO commitments even though such laws had not actually been applied
as yet in a WTO-inconsistent manner. In the context of Article XXIV
consistency, the complaining member could simply argue that it was not being
given MFN treatment by one or more of the parties to an FTA, and the burden
would then fall upon the respondent member or members to demonstrate that
MFN did not need to be provided because the Article XXJV exception was
applicable.
A further question one might ask is, even accepting that many WTO
members could initiate such a dispute, what WTO member would bring such an
action? So far, this has been why the dispute settlement system has not been
forced to address the issue-cases have not been brought. There appears to be
little appetite for the pot to call the kettle black. The reasons for this are likely
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World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States - Defnitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Poje from Korea 1 7.142-44, WTO Doc No
WT/DS202/R (Oct 29, 2001).
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See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities - Regimefor the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas 136, WTO Doc No 136 WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept 9,
1997); Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the World
Trade OrganiZation and Regional Trade Agreements, in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino, eds,
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System 465, 467 n 5 (Oxford 2006).
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See Kwak and Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts (cited in note 74); Dispute Settlement
Understanding, Ann 2 to the WTO Agreement, in Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Apr 15, 1994), Art 3.8, 33 JIM 1152 (1994).
Mavroidis, 40 J World Trade at 187 (cited in note 69).
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77
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See, for example, World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States Antidumping Act of 1916, WTO Doc No WT/DS136/AB/R (Aug 28, 2000).
See Mavroidis, 40J World Trade at 208 (cited in note 69).
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several-fold and a number of rationales have been suggested." For purposes of
this article, the reasons are not important-what matters is that there is no bar
on members utilizing the dispute settlement system to challenge the Article
XXIV consistency of an FTA, and it is not impossible to imagine that a panel
will eventually be faced with this sort of complaint and have to address the issue
substantively.
Such a complaint could potentially have a destabilizing effect on the WTO.
Were a panel ever to determine that a given FTA does not comply with Article
XXIV, the question would arise as to how the offending member should comply
with the decision. Would it have to re-negotiate its FTA or, alternatively, provide
the terms of the FTA on an MFN basis to all WTO members?"o Either of these
possibilities would likely be quite difficult for WTO members to accept. There
would also be a significant ripple effect for the dozens, if not hundreds, of other
FTAs that could have been equally challenged. WTO members presumably have
little interest in sparking this form of chaos and have, therefore, been in a
holding pattern of accepting each other's non-compliant agreements.
However, this state of affairs may not continue indefinitely. A member may
feel that it is losing trade liberalization ground as a result of the proliferation of
FTAs. If its own agreements are largely defensible, the member could take its
chances by initiating a dispute. While there is no reason to think either member
would initiate such a dispute, New Zealand and Singapore are examples of
members with relatively "clean" FTAs that may consider their most significant
market opportunities to be those obtained via the WTO rather than via FTAs,
where any comparative advantage gained is soon lost due to the creation of
other FTAs.

7

s0

81

See Joost Pauwelyn, LegalAvenues to 'MulilateraligingRegionalism": BeyondArficle XXIV, WTO-HEI
Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism, Geneva 1 (Sept 10-12, 2007). Pauwelyn identifies
various reasons why WTO members may refrain from challenging regional trade agreements in
WTO dispute settlement: that because RTAs are ubiquitous it is in no member's interests to
tighten up the rules as it may affect one's own arrangements; that members may not trust panels
with the complicated analysis of conformity with Article XXIV; and that third parties may not
want to challenge agreements that don't cover "substantially all the trade" as the solution may be
that more of the areas in which they compete with one of the FTA partners become covered by
the agreement, rather than less. See id at 2 n 4. See also Mavroidis, 40 J World Trade at 207-12
(cited in note 69).
In the first instance, the respondent would technically only need to provide the MFN treatment to
the complainant(s) as disputes are only binding on the parties subject to them. However, since
other members could easily initiate their own disputes thereafter, as a practical matter, the
respondent would have to provide the tariff rates on an MFN basis or renegotiate its FTA (or
dismantle it).
It is, of course, possible-and perhaps even likely-that the status quo of mass noncompliance
with WTO rules will continue unchallenged. However, the potential for a challenge is a real one,
and the consequences of such a challenge would be significant.
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Although at present this is only a hypothetical, it is certainly possible that a
dispute could be brought that would require a panel to make a substantive
determination as to the consistency between Article XXIV and an FTA. Should
this possibility become a reality, the WTO would face serious threats to its
institutional stability. As a result, although members are not particularly
interested in addressing the Article XXIV problem, they should, nonetheless,
consider whether there are any modifications that could be made to the current
rules that would assist in ameliorating the FTA problem and would, therefore,
reduce the threat of the nuclear solution of a WTO dispute settlement action.
V. NAVIGATING THE HORNS OF THE DILEMMA
The free trade agreement problem does not have an easy fix. To the
contrary, there are several reasons why it is institutionally difficult for the WTO
to address the issue effectively. The first problem is structural. The consensus
decision-making structure of the WTO makes it difficult for members to take
"legislative" action, and as a result the rules have been subject to very few
changes in the fifteen years the WTO has been in existence.82 It would pose a
formidable obstacle to seek to obtain consensus and a will to act on an issue as
fraught as FTAs.
Second, the FTA dilemma cannot be resolved easily because the
overwhelming majority of WTO members are a part of the problem. All
members (save for Mongolia) are parties to at least one FTA, and many are
actively engaged in negotiating additional agreements. A significant number of
these agreements would be unlikely to satisfy the "substantially all the trade"
requirement of GATT Article XXIV, often because sensitive sectors such as
agriculture have been omitted from the FTA or because coverage has otherwise
been limited in some significant fashion. Most commentators are skeptical about
the likelihood that WTO members will ever reach agreement as to what
"substantially all the trade" should mean, or that members will agree to
discipline FTAs in any meaningful way. This skepticism is understandable-in
fact, it seems quite justified in light of the seeming inability of the WTO
membership to make any substantive progress towards resolving these issues.
Indeed, members have not shown a strong interest in negotiating new
substantive provisions to ameliorate the current problems. This is logical.
Presumably, WTO members that are party to relatively few FTAs, or to "clean"
FTAs that would likely comply with any interpretation of "substantially all the
82

There has been only one formal amendment to the WTO rules-the December 2005
Amendment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS") which changed the rules with respect to the compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical
products. See World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the
TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc No WT/L/641 (Dec 6, 2005).
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trade," would balk at the idea of only prospectively implementing stricter rules.
This would give a free ride to hundreds of agreements and would institutionalize
and legitimize the overbroad use of this significant exception to the MFN
principle. On the other hand, the vast majority of WTO members are party to at
least one FTA that would be unlikely to satisfy any measure of "substantially all
the trade," and these members have reason to resist any change that is not solely
prospective as they would need to revisit the terms of agreements that have
already been negotiated and implemented.
Because so many members are tarred by the same brush by being party to
one or more "bad" FTAs, the majority of WTO members would likely react
negatively to a proposed solution that would require renegotiating existing
agreements to bring them into compliance with an accepted definition of
"substantially all the trade."
Third, although it is hard to imagine members accepting a solution that
required altering agreements already in place, it is also difficult to envision a fix
that would exclude all currently existing FTAs, as there are already several
hundred in effect. It would be unsatisfactory to develop new rules that would
give a free pass to the existing agreements as there are so many of them covering
such a large amount of trade," and it is likely that latecomers to negotiating
FTAs and those with a relatively better record of negotiating comprehensive
FTAs would reject any solution that was solely prospective in nature.
With members invested in their current nonconforming agreements, and
difficulties with both retrospective and prospective solutions, improving upon
the status quo is a highly challenging proposition. Nonetheless, in the next
section, I suggest a pragmatic approach to overcoming the obstacles to reform.
VI. A PRAGMATIC PATH FORWARD?
It is easy enough to identify the problems with FTAs and Article XXIV,
but identifying a potential solution that is realistic is far more difficult. As
outlined above, entrenched interests of WTO members mean that reaching
consensus on change will be very challenging.
Commentators have proposed a range of solutions. These include
Baghwati's solution to focus efforts on reducing all tariffs to as close to zero as
possible to negate the preferential effects of FTAs;8 4 Cottier's proposal to clarify
the meaning of "substantially all the trade" and have non-compliance trigger an

83

See, for example, Picker, 26 U Penn J Intl Econ L at 306 (cited in note 33) ("[T]he sheer number
and coverage of existing RTAs suggests that reform of Article XXIV must apply to extant
agreements, not just to future agreements[.]").

84

Bhagwati, Termites at 97-100 (cited in note 33).
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obligation to extend MFN treatment to affected third parties;" Pauwelyn's
proposal to abandon efforts to preference the WTO over FTAs and to treat the
two as of equal status and encourage multilateralization by including MFN
provisions in FTAs;86 and Picker's solution to deem WTO rules supreme over
any RTA provisions in conflict with them.87
This article proposes another approach, whereby new disciplines would be
proposed and implemented with respect to future FTAs, while existing agreements
would have the option of following the new rules or making their agreements
open to accession to any member that is willing to accede to its terms or terms
deemed equivalent. This section will first discuss the proposal and second, will
argue that the proposal proffered may also assist in bridging the gap between
regionalism and multilateralism.
A. The Proposal
The aim is to offer a pragmatic suggestion in recognition of the entrenched
nature of this problem and the difficulties that will arise in attempting to enact a
modification to GATT Article XXIV. Although this suggestion could not
possibly resolve all of the difficulties caused by the proliferation of
noncompliant FTAs, the hope is that it may be gentle enough to be acceptable
to WTO members while still improving the situation currently at hand.
As noted above, the proposal has two parts. First, for future agreements,
members should agree on substantive criteria to be applied in determining an
agreement's consistency with GATT Article XXIV. In other words, consensus
finally needs to be reached as to the meaning of "substantially all the trade."
Because this standard would only be applied as a matter of course on a
prospective basis, members would not necessarily have to alter pre-existing
agreements. Second, for existing agreements, parties to those agreements would
have two options. First, they could conform their agreements to the substantive
criteria agreed to for future agreements; or second, avail themselves of a
"grandfathering" provision that would deem their agreements unchallengeable
on "substantially all the trade" grounds as long as the agreement adopted an
open accession policy if it did not already have one.
In addition, a failure to adopt either option would render the FTA
susceptible to challenge in WTO dispute settlement. It is suggested that if an
FTA was found to fall afoul of the newly clarified rules, the remedy should be
that the tariff reduction provisions of the FTA would have to be offered on an
MFN basis to the WTO membership. If an FTA does not cover "substantially

as
86
87

J Intl Econ L at 599-600 (cited in note 33).
Pauwelyn, LegalAvenues at 34 (cited in note 79).
Picker, 26 U Penn J Intl Econ L at 307 (cited in note 33).
Cottier, 8
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all the trade," it should not be entitled to exempt itself from the general Article I
obligations.
Thus, "clean" agreements would not require any change. For members
with agreements that come close to meeting the "substantially all the trade"
requirement, perhaps this rule would nudge them to liberalize a bit more so as to
satisfy the newly clarified Article XXIV. And for members with dodgier FTAs,
they would not have to radically change their FTAs if they did not want, as long
as they opened up their agreement for others to join if they wished.
With respect to the open accession provision requirement, this could prove
difficult to monitor and administer because accession would still need to be
negotiated. The CRTA could perhaps oversee this process. It would need to be
clear on what basis a potential new member could legitimately be excluded. In
addition, this might be seen as being too soft on the existing FTAs and,
therefore, not be attractive enough to newer participants in bilateral agreements.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, open accession provisions would at least
provide the potential for further liberalization and for a degree of
multilateralization of existing regionalism.
It bears examining whether an agreement that does not cover "substantially
all the trade" but that is open to all members to join is even in need of special
treatment (such as a special status under Article XXIV), or whether it is instead
consistent with GATT Article I in that the terms are open to all. It would seem
that such an agreement would not satisfy the requirements of GATT Article I
because even if the agreement were open to accession by any member, the terms
of accession would need to be negotiated at least to some degree and thus would
not be offered "immediately and unconditionally" as required by GATT Article
I. Therefore, permitting such agreements would require a waiver. Enacting such
a waiver-which could be seen as a form of "grandfather clause" for existing
FTAs-would be an improvement over the status quo and might be pragmatic
enough to be a credible proposal. This would only be offered as a way of
grandfathering the existing inconsistent FTAs. Future notified FTAs would need
to satisfy the clarified Article XXIV requirements."
As noted above, however, careful consideration would have to be given to
how to monitor whether open accession clauses were being administered in
good faith.

8

In general, however, open-access FTAs should be encouraged. These are the types of FTAs that
could best serve as building blocks rather than stumbling blocks. See William H. Cooper, Free
Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Pokey 14 (Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, Library of Congress, 1 Aug 2006); C. Fred Bergsten, Open
Regionalism, Working Paper *97-103 (Inst for Intl Econ 1997).
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B. Open Accession Provisions and Multilateralizing
Regionalism
In the debate over whether FTAs are stepping stones or stumbling blocks,
those who tout regionalism sometimes argue that FTAs have the effect of
chipping away at barriers and ultimately will be aggregated into bigger and bigger
blocks of liberalization. Jagdish Bhagwati has criticized as unrealistic the notion
that FTAs could be aggregated to lead to increasingly multilateralized trading
blocks. In particular, he notes that the "spaghetti bowl" of differing rules of
origin and differences in levels of tariff reduction commitments and other FTA
provisions makes it unlikely that FTAs will be able to be amalgamated into
agreements comprising more parties."
Bhagwati's argument seems unassailable with respect to FTAs that have
very different terms and coverage. But the situation may be less hopeless with
respect to highly comprehensive FTAs. If two different FTAs both reduce
tariffs on all goods to zero for example, it would seem to be easier to join these
FTAs than two FTAs that featured significant sectoral exclusions and differed
from one another in terms of what specifically was excluded. Indeed this has
long been Singapore's vision-that its FTAs would "pave the way for APECwide trade area.""
Further, regional trade could contribute to, rather than hinder, multilateral
trade liberalization through policies of open regionalism such as those espoused
by Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). At the 1994 APEC summit in
Bogor, members agreed to a policy of open regionalism as an objective. Open
regionalism, while not fully defined, would entail members liberalizing
unilaterally and on an MFN basis rather than by pursuing bilateral free trade
agreements. 9 ' As FTAs nonetheless began to proliferate in the Asia-Pacific, the
Pacific Economic Co-operation Council, an entity associated with APEC that
provides it with policy guidance, submitted Best Practice Recommendations for
APEC's FTAs to the 2004 APEC meeting. These practices, adopted at the
meeting, included one that provides that FTAs should have open accession
clauses.92 This is consistent with the open regionalism concept. Prior to the
agreement on the Bogor goals, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore even
suggested that the US open NAFTA to accession by all APEC members. He
used the concept of competitive liberalization to support his idea, arguing that
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Bhagwati, Termites at 92-97 (cited in note 33).
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Christopher M. Dent, New Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pafic 227 (Palgrave MacMillan 2006),
(quoting Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 2001). See also Bhagwati, Termites at 96
(cited in note 33) (further discussing this point).
See, for example, Dent, New Free TradeAgreements at 45-47 (cited in note 90).
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Id at 221.
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some APEC members would quickly accept such an offer, and this would then
impel the rest of the APEC membership to do so as well."
This raises the question-what is the value of open accession provisions?
These clauses appear in a minority of FTAs and generally provide that other
members may accede to the agreement on terms to be negotiated and agreed
to.94 While most such provisions are never acted upon, they at least provide an
opportunity for broadening or multilateralizing regional arrangements. Most of
the FTAs that do have open accession provisions are agreements that are
comparatively comprehensive in their coverage.95 For example, New Zealand
and Singapore frequently include open accession provisions in their FTAs, and
both countries have highly liberalized economies and tend to enter into highquality comprehensive trade agreements. It also bears noting that Taiwan has
proposed that it be a WTO requirement that FTAs contain open accession
provisions." While open accession provisions have not had a dramatic impact to
date, there is the potential for them to assist in multilateralizing regionalism by
facilitating the expansion of FTAs to include more and more members. This
implicates a larger question-whether FTAs in general are stumbling blocks or
stepping stones in the path of multilateral liberalization.
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C. Fred Bergsten, Toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pafic 14 n 16, Joint Conf of the Japan Econ
Foundation and Peterson Inst for Intl Econ on "New Asia-Pacific Trade Initiatives" (Nov 27,
2007).
Open accession provisions are somewhat unusual, but not unheard of. They are more common
amongst APEC partners than elsewhere. Agreements featuring such provisions include the
Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, Art 18.5 (Apr 19, 2005); the
Australia-Thailand Free Trade Agreement, Art 1905 (an 1, 2005); North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), Art 2204 (Dec 17, 1992), 32 ILM 289 (1993); and the Free Trade
Agreement Between Armenia and Moldova, Art 18 (Dec 21, 1995). Within APEC, agreements
centered in Oceania all have open accession provisions; of the agreements centered around the
United States, some have open accession provisions. See, for example, the United StatesAustralia Free Trade Agreement, Art 23.1 (May 18, 2004); the US-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, Art 21.6 (May 6, 2003), 42 ILM 1026). But others do not. See, for example, the Free
Trade Agreement Between the United States and Chile, online at http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text (visited Sept 23, 2010). And among
agreements centered in East Asia, very few FTAs contain open accession provisions. See
Christopher M. Dent, Full Circle? Ideas and ordeals of creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacic,20
Pac Rev 447, 459 Table 1 (2007).
These provisions are usually relatively simple. See, for example, Thailand-New Zealand Closer
Economic Partnership Agreement, Art 18.5 ("This Agreement is open to accession or association,
on terms to be agreed between the Parties, by any member of the WTO, or by any other State or
separate customs territory.").
World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, WTO Doc No TN/RL/W186
(Aug 3, 2005). See also discussion in Matthew Schaefer, Ensuring that Regional Trade Agreements
Complement the W/TO System: U.S. Unilateralisma Supplement to IVTO Initiatives?,10 J Intl Econ L 585
(2007).
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As a general proposition, I consider FTAs to be stumbling blocks rather
than stepping stones. Competitive liberalization seems unlikely to materialize as
a result of the proliferation of the usual non-comprehensive FTAs. However
comprehensive, open accession agreements may provide the best possibility to
prove the exception to the rule as they provide a more realistic opportunity to
"multilateralize" regionalism." This could particularly take hold in the APEC
context where open regionalism has long been a central tenet, even if never fully
defined." It has been suggested that APEC's open regionalism experience may
serve as a useful model for making trade agreements more susceptible to being
multilateralized, and in turn to defragmenting the world trading system.
The process of multilateralizing regionalism may become more realistic if
the growth arises not out of the combination of disparate bilateral agreements,
but rather from particular open accession agreements expanding to become
larger and larger, as is contemplated by the transformation of the Trans-Pacific
Economic Partnership Agreement (also known as the P-4 Agreement) into a
broader Trans-Pacific partnership.
The P-4 Agreement between New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, and Chile is
a highly comprehensive trade agreement with an open accession provision. The
goal of the P-4 Agreement countries was to negotiate a strategic agreement that
could serve as a template for a broader Asia-Pacific agreement. Early suggestions
that the P-4 could serve as a "dock" for other interested APEC members
resulted in skepticism that the P-4 "is clearly too small [to] provide a foundation
for APEC-wide arrangements."' 00 However, this skepticism may soon give way
because negotiations have been initiated to create a modified and expanded
version of the agreement to include the US, Australia, Peru, and Vietnam. 0' If
the US does accede to the new iteration, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership
97
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See generally Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 Nw J Intl L & Bus 39 (2006); Cho, 42
Harv Intl L J at 454-57 (cited in note 69) and Pauwelyn, LegalAvenues at 33-35 (cited in note 79).
See also Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism and the WITO: Should the Rules be Changed? in Caroline
Freund, ed, The IVTO and ReciprocalPrefetrndalTradingAgreements 494 (Elgar 2007) ("[D]ynamics of
regional groups that are open to all newcomers will differ from those of exclusive or selective
ones.'.
See, for example, Srikanta Chatterjee, Regionalism, Open Regionalism, the APEC and the WTO: An
Economic Perspectivefrom New Zealand (Massey U Discussion Paper No. 99.03, Apr 1999), online at
http://econ.massey.ac.nz/publications/discuss/dp99-03.pdf (visited Sept 23, 2010).
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See Cho, 27 Nwj Intl L & Bus at 77-78 (cited in note 97).
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Bergsten, Open Regionalism at 14 n 16 (cited in note 88).

101 The United States negotiated with the original P-4 member countries in 2008 with respect to
financial services and investment provisions. It recently participated in broader negotiations
regarding full accession to what is now being called the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP.
Although the TPP will be a new agreement, rather than a formal expansion of the P-4, the P-4
was the starting point for the TPP, and its open accession provision invited and facilitated the
type of expansion negotiations that have, in fact, taken place. For details on these negotiations,
see Trans-Pacific Partnership Home Page, online at www.ustr.gov/tpp (visited Sept 23, 2010).
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(TPP), the new iteration's prospects to serve as a gateway agreement will seem
much stronger. In addition, the countries negotiating the TPP Agreement have
made it clear that further expansion is both possible and desirable. Thus, while
draft text of the TPP is not yet available, it appears it will maintain the open
accession provision present in the precursor P-4 Agreement, facilitating TPP
expansion to additional countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has utilized the Prisoners' Dilemma to explain the paradoxical
behavior of WTO members that flock to FTAs despite their own beliefs in the
superiority of liberalization through the WTO. It suggests a pragmatic method
for breaking the current deadlock regarding Article XXJV-inconsistent FTAs. A
solution of some sort should be pursued, no matter how difficult, because it is a
real possibility that a member could challenge such an FTA in WTO dispute
settlement, with potentially significant destabilizing ripple effects for other
members. The solution offered here provides non-compliant FTA members
with a choice-conform their agreements to the to-be-clarified "substantially all
the trade" requirement, or add an open accession clause to their existing
agreements. The latter option may be perceived as too soft, but open accession
clauses have an independent benefit: they may assist in multilateralizing
regionalism, as is currently being seen with the evolution of the open accession
P-4 Agreement into a broader TPP agreement that will include, inter alia, the US
and Australia.
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